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SCHOLARLY OPINION
Client Identity and the Attorney-Client Privilege:
The Tax Attack Continues
CRAIG J. LANGSTRAAT*
The attorney-client privilege has been utilized by lawyers in tax
proceedings as a shield to prevent disclosure of a client's identity.
While this tactic has not always prevailed, it has been sufficiently
successful to prompt action by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) in an attempt to curtail its use.
This Opinion first will discuss the availability of an attorney-
client privilege to protect a client's identity in tax controversies.'
Second, recent tax-motivated governmental attempts to require all
attorneys to report a client's involvement in substantial cash trans-
actions will be analyzed.2 Finally, strategies for dealing with
I.R.C. § 60501 as it relates to a client's identity and the attorney-
client privilege are presented.3
I. PURPOSES AND BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege has been a part of the common law
longer than any other confidential communication privilege. 4 Ac-
cording to the American Bar Association Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, preserving confidences of the client is an
ethical responsibility of every attorney:
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter
he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage
of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his
independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and
important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance
of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confi-
dences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full devel-
opment of facts essential to proper representation of the client
* Associate Professor of Accounting/Law and Taxation, Edwin L. Cox School of
Business, Southern Methodist University; B.S. (1972), J.D. (1978) Arizona State Univer-
sity; LL.M. (Taxation) (1982) University of San Diego; member of Arizona and California
bars; C.P.A.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 4-40.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 41-56.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
4. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
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but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.,
The availability of the attorney-client privilege in federal litiga-
tion is embodied in Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
relevant part, that rule states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as
to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of
a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.'
The key concept in the Federal Rules of Evidence with regard to
the privilege is the common law as interpreted by federal courts.
Case analysis therefore is critical to understanding the scope of
the attorney-client privilege.
The United States Supreme Court has been deciding cases in-
volving the attorney-client privilege since 1888. In Hunt v. Black-
burn, the Court stated that the privilege "is founded upon the ne-
cessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of
persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when
free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."
In 1976, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States' recog-
nized that the purpose of the privilege is "to encourage clients to
make full disclosure to their attorneys." The Court commented
further in Trammel v. United States0 that "[t]he lawyer-client
privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know
all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if
the professional mission is to be carried out."11
The most recent Supreme Court discussion of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege came in Upjohn Co. v. United States.1 2 There, the
Court stated:
Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication be-
tween attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1979).
6. FED. R. EvID. 501.
7. 128 U.S. 464, 470, (1888).
8. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
9. Id. at 403.
10. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
11. Id. at 51.
12. 449 U.S. 383 (1980).
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public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advo-
cacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.13
II. A TAXPAYER'S IDENTITY AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the issue of nondisclosure of a taxpayer's identity under
the attorney-client privilege, three U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
decisions have directly addressed the topic. The leading case in
the area is Baird v. Koerner,'4 decided by the Ninth Circuit in
1960.
In Baird, the taxpayers' accountants consulted a tax attorney to
discuss the best course of action to follow if the IRS subsequently
instituted criminal proceedings against the taxpayers. The ac-
countants had determined that certain of the taxpayers' returns
erroneously underreported the tax due; however, no governmental
investigation had commenced at the time of this consultation.1 5
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayers' general attorney visited the
same tax attorney and discussed the specifics of the returns.
Neither the accountants nor the general attorney disclosed the
identity of the taxpayers to the tax attorney. As a result of this
conference, the general attorney delivered a check to the tax at-
torney to cover the calculated deficiency, the accrued interest and
the tax attorney's fees. The tax attorney then forwarded a cash-
ier's check in the amount of the calculated deficiency plus the ac-
crued interest, along with a cover letter to the IRS. The cover
letter did not disclose the taxpayers' identities, the tax years in-
volved, or the identities of the accountants and general attorney.',
An IRS special agent responded to the letter by issuing a de-
partmental summons requiring identification of the taxpayers, at-
torneys and accountants involved in the case. When the tax attor-
ney refused to disclose these identities, the IRS proceeded in the
district court with a petition for enforcement of the summons and
an order to show cause. The district court granted the petition.
When the tax attorney again refused to disclose the identities, he
was committed to custody until he was willing to provide the in-
formation. The district court granted a stay, however, until the
13. Id. at 389.
14. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
15. Id. at 626.
16. Id.
[Vol. 23
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appeal could be heard by the Ninth Circuit.1"
A preliminary issue in Baird was whether state or federal law
applied to the application of the attorney-client privilege.18 To re-
solve this issue, the Baird court first concluded that "there is no
federal body of law that requires the exclusion of the identity of
the client from the extent of the attorney-client privilege." 119 The
court then determined that the law of the forum state, California,
applied.2 0 The Baird decision therefore must be evaluated in light
of its state law background.
While recognizing California's general rule that the attorney-
client privilege ordinarily does not include the identity of the cli-
ent,21 the appellate court found that the following exception ap-
plied to the facts of this case:22
"The name of the client will be considered privileged matter
where the circumstances of the case are such that the name of
the client is material only for the purpose of showing an ac-
knowledgment of guilt on the part of such client of the very of-
fenses on account of which the attorney was employed ***"I'
The facts of the Baird case brought the client's identity squarely
within the exception to the general rule.2 4 The court therefore re-
leased the attorney from any resp6nsibility to disclose the client's
identity, recognizing the applicability of the attorney-client privi-
lege.2 5 The court did note that there would be certain situations in
which the privilege could not be invoked:
If the identification of the client conveys information which ordi-
narily would be conceded to be part of the usual privileged com-
17. Id. at 627.
18. Id. at 631. FED R. EVID. 501 has provided for a federal law analysis since its
adoption in 1975. At the time of the Baird decision, however, choice of law was still an
important issue since no such federal law existed.
19. Baird, 279 F.2d at 631.
20. Id. at 632.
21. Id. at 633.
22. Id. at 633; see also Witnesses, 81 AM. JUR. 2D § 213, at 244 (1976).
23. Baird, 279 F.2d at 633 (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283e (1957)). The trend
seems to be for the individual states to recognize, or be poised to recognize, this exception
or one based on "unusual circumstances," nevertheless maintaining the client's identity
privileged. See, e.g., Ex parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960); Sepler v. State,
191 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Colman v. Heidenreich, 269 Ind. 419, 381
N.E.2d 866 (1978); State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
824 (1976); Morris v. State, 4 Md. App. 252, 242 A.2d 559 (1968); In re Kozlov, 79 N.J.
232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979); Matter of Jacqueline F., 94 Misc. 2d 96, 404 N.Y.S.2d 790
(1978); Lemley v. Kaiser, 6 Ohio St. 3d 258, 452 N.E.2d 1304 (1983); Cole v. Johnson,
103 Or. 319, 205 P.2d 282 (1922); Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1980); McDonald v. Berry, 243 S.C. 453, 134 S.E.2d 392 (1964). See also Saltzburg,
Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IowA L. REV. 811
(1981); Annotation, Disclosure of Name, Identity, Address, Occupation or Business of
Client as Violation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 16 A.L.R. 3D 1047.
24. Baird, 279 F.2d at 633.
25. Id. at 635.
1986]
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munication between attorney and client, then the privilege
should extend to such identification in the absence of other fac-
tors. Such factors are (a) the commencing of litigation on behalf
of the client where he voluntarily subjects himself to the juris-
diction of the court; (b) an identification relating to an employ-
ment by some third person, not the client nor his agent; (c) an
employment of an attorney with respect to future criminal or
fraudulent transactions; (d) the attorney himself being a defend-
ant in a criminil matter.2"
The IRS did not capitulate after the Baird decision. The gov-
ernment encountered a virtually identical factual situation in Til-
lotson v. Boughner.27 In fact, the court commented in its opinion
that the defendant attorney in Tillotson had planned the litigated
transaction in light of the Baird decision.2
The Tillotson court did not have any trouble with the state ver-
sus federal law issue as the judges found that Illinois and federal
law looked to the same body of common law in the attorney-client
privilege area.29 Without substantial comment, the court held that
the defendant attorney need not disclose his client's identity based
on the Baird decision and on a district court case which followed
Baird.30
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also dealt with
the client disclosure issue in United States v. Tratner.3 1 The attor-
ney in this case deposited $10,000 in cash into his client trust ac-
count. A few days later, he withdrew by check an identical
amount. The bank reported the cash transaction to the IRS as
required by statute.32
An audit of the attorney's return was instigated by the IRS as a
result of the bank's reporting. An IRS agent requested to see the
cancelled $10,000 check in question. Showing the check to the
agent, the attorney covered up the name of the payee. The attor-
ney refused to provide any additional information based on the
attorney-client privilege.33
In the district court action brought by the IRS to enforce its
summons to produce the check and all information related to it,
the attorney made the check and his client files available to the
court for an in camera inspection. The district court's opinion or-
26. Id. at 632.
27. 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965).
28. Id. at 665.
29. Id. at 666.
30. N.L.R.B. v. Harvey, 235 F. Supp. 580 (D.C. W. Va. 1964), affd, 349 F.2d 900
(4th Cir. 1965).
31. 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 250. The bank reported the cash transaction as required by 31 U.S.C. §
1081 which now is revised 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1982).
33. Trainer, 511 F.2d at 250.
[Vol. 23
5
Langstraat: SCHOLARLY OPINION -- Client Identity and the Attorney-Client Priv
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1986
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
dered the attorney to produce the cancelled check, but did not
require the production of the client files. 4 The summons for "all
information" related to the check was found to be overbroad.3 5
Both the attorney and the government appealed the district court's
decision to the Seventh Circuit."6
The issue of whether state or federal law controlled the attor-
ney-client privilege was again sidestepped by the court of appeals;
rather, the court based its opinion on its finding that Illinois law
and federal law were both patterned after the same common law
authorities.3 7 The court reviewed both the general rule that a cli-
ent's identity is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, 3
and the well-established exceptions to that rule in the tax area
represented by the Baird and Tillotson decisions. The court noted
that the in camera evidence was not part of the record and the
district court had not delineated the specific applicability or non-
applicability of the attorney-client privilege based on the in cam-
era inspection. Therefore, the court remanded the case for such a
determination related to the cancelled check.39 The district court's
holding that the "all information" portion of the summons was
overbroad was upheld by the appeals court.40
Unfortunately for precedential purposes, no reported opinion
details the ultimate disposition of this case. The most positive in-
ference from Tratner is that the Seventh Circuit seems to ac-
knowledge the possibility that the attorney-client privilege could
protect the client's identity in this type of situation.
III. THE NEWEST ATTACK
The newest form of governmental attack to force attorney dis-
closure of client identity in a tax context originated with the Tax
Reform Act of 1984.41 In this Act, Congress added section 60501
to the Internal Revenue Code.4 2 This provision requires any per-
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965)).
38. Tratner, 511 F.2d at 252 (citing United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th
Cir. 1973)), Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965) and Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, (1963)).
39. Tratner, 511 F.2d at 253-55.
40. Id. at 255.
41. Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 146(a)(d), 98 Stat. 494, 685-87 (1984).
42. I.R.C. § 60501 (Supp. III 1985).
Returns Relating To Cash Received In Trade Or Business.
(a) Cash receipts of more than $10,000. Any person-
(1) who is engaged in a trade or business, and
(2) who, in the course of such trade or business, receives more than $10,000 in
cash in I transaction (or 2 or more related transactions),
1986]
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son receiving more than $10,000 in cash in the course of that per-
son's trade or business to file an informational return4 3 with the
IRS." The return must disclose the payer's name, address and
taxpayer identification number, as well as the amount of cash re-
ceived and the date and nature of the transaction.4 5
Transactions by most financial institutions are exempted from
these requirements,4" as are those occurring entirely outside the
United States.4 7 Any person actually filing a return under this
statute also must notify the person who paid the cash that a re-
turn has been filed.48 This notification must indicate the amount
shall make the return described in subsection (b) with respect to such
transaction (or related transactions) at such time as the Secretary may by
regulations prescribe.
(b) Form and manner of returns. A return is described in this subsection if such
return-
(1) is in such form as the Secretary may prescribe,
(2) contains
(A) the name, address, and TIN of the person from whom the cash was
received,
(B) the amount of cash received,
(C) the date and nature of the transaction, and
(D) such other information as the Secretary may prescribe.
(c) Exceptions.-
(1) Cash received by financial institutions. Subsection (a) shall not apply to--
(A) cash received in a transaction reported under title 31, United States
Code, if the Secretary determines that reporting under this section
would duplicate the reporting to the Treasury under title 31, United
States Code, or
(B) cash received by any financial institution (as defined in subparagraphs
(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (J), (K), (R), and (S) of section
5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.
(2) Transactions occurring outside the United States.
Except to the extent provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
subsection (a) shall not apply to any transaction if the entire transaction
occurs outside the United States.
(d) Cash includes foreign currency. For purposes of this section, the term "cash"
includes foreign currency.
(c) Statements to be furnished to persons with respect to whom information is
furnished. Every person making a return under subsection (a) shall furnish to
each person whose name is set forth in such a return a written statement
showing-
(1) the name and address of the person making such return, and
(2) the aggregate amount of cash described in subsection (a) received by the
person making such return.
The written statement required under the preceeding sentence shall be furnished to the
person on or before January 31 of the year following the calendar year for which the return
under subsection (a) was made.
43. IRS Form 8300, due 15 days after the reportable cash payment is received.
44. I.R.C. § 60501(a) (Supp. III 1985).
45. Id. § 60501(b).
46. See Id. § 6050I(c)(I)(B). Financial institutions have a parallel reporting require-
ment under title 31 of the United States Code.
47. I.R.C. § 6050I(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
48. Id. § 60501(e).
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of the cash payment reported and must be furnished on or before
January 31 following the applicable reporting calendar year.49
The purpose of this legislation is to force disclosure of the iden-
tity of those dealing in substantial cash transactions.50 This infor-
mation could, and probably would, be used by the IRS in subse-
quent income tax investigations. The Temporary Regulations
issued in accordance with IRC section 6050151 expressly indicated
that attorneys were covered by the disclosure requirements both
for payments received for services and for trust account transac-
tions. 52 The final regulations also adopted this position. 53The
American legal community quickly recognized that the disclosure
required by I.R.C. section 60501 could violate an attorney's ethi-
cal duty of confidentiality to a client.5 4 While the Treasury deci-
sion announcing the Temporary Regulations did indicate that the
Treasury was willing to consider an exemption to section 60501
for attorneys, 55 statements from the Justice Department demon-
strate strong governmental opposition to such an exception.5 6 The
Treasury Decision announcing the final regulations stated that an
exception for attorneys was not adopted because neither the stat-
ute nor its legislative history provided for one.
57
IV. SUGGESTIONS AND STRATEGIES
An attorney who discloses the identity of a client dealing in
cash pursuant to section 60501 is subjecting the client to probable
IRS investigation and possible future civil or criminal penalties.58
Such an action could subject the attorney to sanctions from the
49. Id.
50. "The [Senate] committee believes that reporting on the spending of large
amounts of cash will enable the Internal Revenue Service to identify taxpayers with large
cash incomes." S. Rep. No. 169, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050-I-IT (1985).
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050-I-IT, Q-5, A-5 (1985).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050-I-I (1986).
54. See, e.g., "Should Attorneys Be Exempt from Cash Fees Reporting Require-
ment?" A.B.A. Section of Taxation Newsletter, 1 (1985); Wolf, Ethical Dilemma, 72
A.B.A. J., 19 (Jan. 1986).
55.
Although these temporary regulations require attorneys to report with respect to
the receipt of cash in excess of $10,000, the [Internal Revenue] Service will enter-
tain comments from the legal community concerning the possiblity of developing
an exception to the reporting requirement for information on transactions which
might fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.
T.D. 8025, 1985-1 C.B. 348.
56. According to Deputy Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen, "the creation of an
exception for lawyers from reporting under Section 60501 would be contrary to public pol-
icy and effective tax administration." See Wolf, supra note 54.
57. T.D. 8098, IRS Bulletin No. 1986-41 (Oct. 14, 1986).
58. See supra note 50.
1986]
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state bar for ethical violations5" and/or to liability to the client.
To avoid these problems, practicing attorneys have three basic
alternatives. First, the attorney could refuse to accept cash in
amounts generating a reporting requirement under section 60501.
However, this practice could cause clients to engage another attor-
ney willing to accept the cash.
Second, the attorney could accept the cash, but not report the
transaction as required by section 60501. This would subject the
attorney to a $100 penalty per failure to file a return,"0 and possi-
ble criminal sanctions.6 '
A third alternative would be for the attorney to accept the cash
and report the transaction without disclosing any information
which could be used by the IRS to identify the client (i.e., name,
address, taxpayer identification number). This refusal to identify
the client would be based on an assertion of attorney-client
privilege.
While this third alternative likely would result in a confronta-
tion with the IRS, it has the dual advantages of upholding the
attorney's ethical duty to the client while avoiding the penalties
for failure to file the required documents. Also, any litigation in-
stituted by the government to force disclosure of the client's iden-
tity would be subject to the precedents favoring the attorney dis-
cussed earlier in this Opinion. 62 Presumably, a case-by-case
analysis of the particular facts then would be undertaken by the
court.63 Since the purpose of reporting under § 60501 is to subject
the payer to an income tax investigation,6 a decision upholding
the attorney-client privilege to protect the client's identity would
be consistent with the reasoning of the Baird, Tillotson, and
Tratner decisions.
CONCLUSION
Pending the creation of an exception to I.R.C. section 60501 for
attorneys, practicing attorneys receiving substantial cash pay-
ments are faced with conflicting duties. Attorneys have an ethical
duty to clients on the one hand and a governmental reporting duty
on the other. In order to avoid liability to the client, possible disci-
59. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. This is applicable if the principle con-
tained in EC 4-1 has been adopted by the subject state bar.
60. I.R.C. §§ 6652(a)(1)(B)(vi), 6652(a)(3)(A)(iii), and 6652(a)(3)(B) (Supp. III
1985); See also Id. § 6678(a) which imposes a $50 penalty for failure to furnish the annual
statement to any payer under I.R.C. § 60501(e).
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050-I-1(g)(3) (1986).
62. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 50.
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plinary proceedings and/or governmental sanctions, the best
course of action for the attorney at this time appears to be to re-
port required cash transactions without identifying information
under an assertion of attorney-client privilege. While this course
of action may lead to litigation, recent precedent upholding pro-
tection of the client's identity under the attorney-client privilege in
tax cases should lead the court to reach a result favorable to the
attorney.
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